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CALIBRATING PATENT LIFETIMES
Eric E. Johnsont

ABSTRACT

The patent system could better achieve its primary mission of
incentivizing technological innovation by moving away from the onesize-fits-all 20-year term for patents and moving to a system of
varying durations for different categories of invention. The current
patent duration is arbitrary, the result of entrenched historical
accident.Allowing upward variancefrom the 20-year term in discrete
categories of invention offers the prospect of boosting innovation in
impoverished technological sectors. Allowing downward variance in
other categories would benefit overall social welfare by removing
needless technological monopolization and associated deadweight
loss.
Current economic models and available economic data do not
allow for the academic calculation of optimal patent lifetimes in the
real world. This paper proposes practicalproceduralmechanisms to
gather and synthesize information about innovation incentives and
returns, and to make use of that information in decision-making
paradigms that would vary patent terms to make the patent system
more economically beneficial than it currently is.
An appendix to this paper uses theoretical evolutionary biology
to criticize economic theorists who have suggested that very long or
even
infinite durations for patents may be optimal.

t Attorney in private practice in Los Angeles, California; Adjunct Professor of Law,
Whittier Law School. Thanks to Terry Fisher for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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INTRODUCTION

Human societies have always sought to increase their standard of
living. The most obvious means employed the conquest and
enslavement of other societies. Today, in our more civilized world,
we are left to expand our economy through innovation, both
technological and artistic.
As growth mechanisms, conquest and innovation share a
common problem: the free-rider dilemma. A warring society must
expect that individuals who have the choice between serving in the
military or refusing service-while reaping the benefits of a
victorious war no matter what-should rationally choose to refuse
service. If everyone makes this choice, the conquering will come to a
halt. Thus, a system of compulsory military service is usually required
to overcome free-rider effects. An innovating society must expect that
firms, which have the choice of expending R&D themselves or freely
copying the innovations of others, will rationally choose to copy. It is
a familiar argument: If innovators have their works freely copied,
competition will drive down the price of the innovative products to
the price of production, exclusive of R&D costs. If innovators cannot
recoup the costs of their innovations, they will not innovate.
Patents and copyrights are our society's flagship vehicles for
overcoming the free-rider dilemma with regard to technological and
artistic innovation. By granting a term of monopoly rights in the form
of a patent, the government provides a mechanism for innovators to
appropriate their returns from R&D expenditures.
Yet despite the importance our society has assigned to them,
patents are a remarkably crude mechanism for providing incentives to
innovate. First, patent protection is either on or off. If an invention
meets the threshold standards of patentability, it is accorded full
protection. If it barely misses, the patent regime gives it no protection.
Even more striking is that virtually all patentable inventions in the
United States, whether paper-clip improvements or revolutionary
molecules, are accorded a one-size-fits-all 20-year term of monopoly
rights. '
This paper argues that varying adjustments to the duration of
patent monopoly rights offers the potential to better calibrate
incentives so as to grow the economy in a more efficient and effective
way. Part I examines the vehicle of patents, compares the patent
regime to other incentive mechanisms, both real and hypothetical, and

1.

Pharmaceuticals are an important exception. See infra Part IV.
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suggests that patents are potentially, if not necessarily, the most
promising such mechanism. Part II discusses the problems with the
current patent regime. Part III analyzes the levers of the patent
regime-how different legal entitlements and extra-legal conditions
affect the value of patents and their quality of appropriability, i.e.,
their effectiveness in appropriating returns on R&D. The rest of the
paper then proceeds on the assumption that adjustments to the patent
regime should be done through a manipulation of their duration. Part
IV reviews examples of differential durations that may be found in
current and past intellectual-property systems. Part V evaluates
various ways of manipulating patent duration, first proposing certain
ad hoc or incomplete recommendations, then analyzing the
substantive problems involved in creating prescriptions for patentduration reform, and finally discussing reform from a procedural
perspective, advancing promising decision-making paradigms.
I. CHOOSING PATENTS AS AN INNOVATION INCENTIVE

Patents or patent-like incentives are certainly not the only
incentives for innovation. There are several alternative schemes, both
in theory and in current practice, which may serve as incentives to
overcome traditional free-rider effects. This section will review these
alternatives and conclude that, while other incentives should not be
excluded, patent is an important scheme that deserves our attention,
both in terms of analyzing it and in trying to fix its weaknesses.
We can conceptualize incentive mechanisms as comprising three
distinct categories. The first category consists of legal solutions to the
free-rider dilemma. These systems use coercive power to create and
enforce rights and redistribute resources. The second category is that
of anarchic or quasi-legal systems, which depend on goodwill and a
sense of moral duty rather than coercive enforcement. The third
category-which is the most important empirically-is that of
business-based mechanisms for incentivizing innovation. These are
business tactics used by firms to finesse their way into appropriating
returns from their R&D investments despite the potential for freerider effects. These business techniques take advantage of market
conditions and the decision-making characteristics of customers.
Legal solutions all aspire to make society better off or to uphold
some other philosophical value. Anarchic and quasi-legal solutions
also aspire to achieve social value, but unlike legal regimes, they
usually assume a certain level of selfless behavior from individuals.
Business-based solutions are powered by the desire for equity-holder
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profits and not society-wide benefit. Thus, it is not surprising that
these managerial mechanisms for appropriating returns from R&D
often conflict with the welfare of persons outside the firm.
A. Legal Schemes for Appropriation
The following legal incentive structures are arranged in order
roughly from most to least desirable.
Monopoly Rights-The most familiar varieties of intellectualproperty protection are some form of limited-duration monopoly
rights-a government-granted set of exclusive rights that may be
exercised only by the creator or by persons licensed by the creator.
Traditional forms of government-granted limited-term monopoly
rights include utility patents, design patents, plant patents, and
copyrights. More recently, sui generis limited-term monopoly rights
3
2
have been created for semiconductor mask works, boat hull designs,
4
and, in the European Union, database rights. Monopoly rights are
supposed to stimulate the innovation and creation of intellectual
property and, at the same time, provide for the transfer of the
protected works into the public domain upon the expiration of the
rights. In addition to allowing the appropriation of returns from the
innovation, the grant of monopoly rights allows the innovator to
control the destiny of the innovation during the term. This control
means that creators may appropriate not only monetary returns from
their innovations but also the psychic reward of being able to control
their own creations. On a more utilitarian level, some have argued
that this control allows for a more well-managed exploitation of the
innovation. 5 In the case of patents, the innovation must be publicly
disclosed as a condition of receiving a patent. 6 This facilitates
competition after the expiration of the term and lowers the price of the
product of the innovation to the production cost.

2. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. § 901-14 (2000).
3. Vessel Hull Design Protection Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 1301-08 (2000).
4. Counsel Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 27.3.96 (EC), availableat
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/legreg/docs/969ec.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
5. See Edward Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265 (1977). For a critique, see Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 842 (1990).
6. In contrast to patent, copyright does not require public disclosure as a condition of
protection. Copyrighted material may be registered with the Library of Congress but not be
available to the general public. Software developers have taken advantage of this policy for the
protection of their code.
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Government Rewards-A system most convincingly advanced
by Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele proposes giving
governmentally funded and administered rewards to inventors as an
alternative to the grant of monopoly rights. 7 Shavell and van Ypersele
suggest several economic reasons why such a system would be
preferable, including a reduction in deadweight loss that is normally
associated with a non-discriminatory monopoly pricing of the
products of the innovation and the legal clearance for other inventors
to work immediately to improve the design. There are, however,
several difficulties with a government-rewards system. First, it
appears that it would be very difficult, as an administrative matter, to
determine the proper level of reward. 8 Second, when improvements
are made to existing inventions, it would be difficult to determine the
relative worth of the two inventions in the final product. 9 Perhaps
even more confounding, the proposal raises the question of what
ought to be considered a rewardable innovation. A government
rewards system could go beyond the scope of the current patent
regime to cover unpatentable innovation-which, despite its lack of
coverage by the current patent regime, is economically very
important. But defining such rewardable innovation for the purposes
of the reward scheme could be intractably difficult. 10 Finally, the

7. See Steven M. Shavell & T. van Ypersele, Reward Versus Intellectual Property
Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001). See also Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of
Property Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to
Generate Information, and the Alternatives of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1998).

8. Shavell and van Ypersele propose using sales data and surveys to determine the proper
level of reward, and they further suggest that if the rewards system were optional, then the
availability of the choice of patent protection would incentivize the government to keep rewards
high. Even if the rewards were usually too low, the authors argue, the availability of the choice
could only be economically advantageous, because when the rewards system was chosen, there
would be gains from elimination of deadweight loss, and the rewards system would incentivize
the development of innovations for which the patent system does not provide sufficient reward.
9. Shavell and van Ypersele acknowledge this difficulty. In patent, where one inventor
holds the patent on the underlying invention and the other inventor owns the patent on the
improvement, the inventors are said to have "blocking" patents, and any product manufactured
with the improvement would require licenses from both inventors. Thus, in the patent regime,
such problems are solved, at least theoretically, by Coasian bargains between the holders of the
blocking patents. That is, where transaction costs are zero, the parties will come to an agreement
to make the product, because both will gain more than they would in absence of a bargain.
Shavell and van Ypersele seem to doubt the real-world application of Coasian theory, calling
attention to the situation in which Robert Fulton, the inventor of the steamboat, refused the
licenses that would have allowed the manufacture of steamboats with the improvements of other
inventors.
10. Patents are granted to only a limited class of innovations that meet the standards of
nonobviousness, utility, and novelty, and which can be reduced to a series of concrete claims.
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Shavell and van Ypersele system could have undesirable
distributional consequences, which could, in turn, give rise to
problems of overall welfare loss. II
Government Subsidies-Many governments currently stimulate
innovation by providing subsidies in the form of tax relief or cash
grants. This system is the reverse of the Shavell and van Ypersele
system of ex post rewards. 12 Subsidies are granted before research is
undertaken. The disadvantage of subsidies compared with a rewards
system is that it is far more difficult to estimate what the value of an
innovation will be ex ante than it is to do so ex post. Therefore,
government subsidies retain all the administrative problems of a
rewards regime and additionally incur information problems that
rewards regimes would not have. On the other hand, subsidies may
allow firms and researchers to undertake R&D projects that they
might not otherwise be able to finance, especially if those projects
have a social value that exceeds their business value. 13 Subsidies also
Inventions that do not meet these requirements, however, can often be of tremendous economic
importance. Yet the patent system does nothing to overcome the free-rider problems associated
with such innovations. Instead, the slack in the system is picked up by the economically
troublesome and highly criticized trade-secret regime. Accepting, arguendo, that trade secret is
less economically desirable than patent, then one of the great promises of a reward system is that
it could cover these non-patentable innovations. But, because trade secrets protect such ethereal
creations as "know how" and "undeveloped ideas," deciding exactly what counts as a
rewardable innovation could become a boundless problem. This problem would be similar to the
problem Shavell and van Ypersele acknowledged with regard to improvement patents, but
because of the fuzziness and undefined nature of trade-secret-style innovation, the magnitude
problem would be many times greater.
11. As Shavell and van Ypersele see it, the rewards system would raise money from
general income taxes. This decouples the use of intellectual property from the payment for it.
Thus, a non-consumer of intellectual property, such as a person who prefers to sit at home and
knit all day, will pay for movies, music, and software for everyone else. Since movies, music,
and software, to take three examples, can be and increasingly will be downloaded via the
Interet, a rewards-system would mean that people would have to pay virtually nothing for these
products, because the per-unit production costs are basically zero. Since media production is a
huge, multi-billion-dollar industry, the distributional effects of this system would not be trivial.
Such distributional effects could lead to overall social welfare loss because of the disconnect
between the individual consumer's willingness to pay and the intellectual-property producer's
willingness to produce or innovate. Thus, there could be a new kind of free-rider problem in
which high-volume consumers of intellectual property become free riders off of low-volume
consumers. Without being required to pay for the intellectual property out of their own pockets,
consumer preferences may be skewed from a normal competitive market ideal, resulting in the
creation of too much intellectual property.
12. Even though government grants are provided before a research project is undertaken,
they effectively have an ex post character to the extent that they are awarded to researchers who
have a track record of success in creating useful innovation.
13. Assuming a perfectly operating capital market, inventors seeking to create innovations
with business value would receive financing for research without the help of the government. As
noted in the text, however, if the social value of the innovation exceeds the business or
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put the risk on the government and not on the innovator. The potential
importance of this transference of risk is highlighted if we conceive of
the value not as a function of the end-product of the innovation but as
a function of the activity of searching for innovation. 14 Government
subsidies could be accompanied by a requirement of public disclosure
or a requirement that the fruits of the research be placed in the public
domain. 15
Trade Secrets-Trade secrets are ideas, know-how, or
information that may be protected by what is largely a contract
regime with special remedies. 16 Trade secret doctrine has the
advantage of protecting a broad and indeterminate set of
innovations-going well beyond the range that is susceptible to
patent, copyright, or other forms of monopoly-rights protection. The
disadvantages of trade secrets are substantial, however. Because firms
can legally appropriate other firms' innovations by duplicating their
work, the trade-secret system encourages redundant expenditure of
R&D money, which is wasteful from a societal perspective. Of the
four legal regimes for incentivizing innovation, only trade secret is
investment value, then government subsidies would allow the development of beneficial
innovation that would be ignored by capital markets.
14. Economic models could include insurance or risk-spreading investment devices to
neutralize this benefit of government subsidies as compared to patents or government rewards.
But these devices might not take into account the full value of non-fruitful research. Non-fruitful
research adds to technological knowledge by teaching how not to attempt to solve a certain
problem, and it may increase society's industrial innovative capacity by teaching skills and
know-how to specific persons involved in the non-fruitful effort. Both of these society-wide
benefits are appropriate for government intervention even in the presence of fanciful economic
assumptions. Furthermore, subsidies may allow creativity to flourish among researchers,
allowing them to pursue big breakthroughs with a low chance of success, rather than
incentivizing them to pursue a steady stream of smaller advances that would better attract
investment capital through the establishment of a good track record. Because of the foregoing, it
may occasionally be better to think of R&D itself as the desired innovative activity rather than
looking to end-product innovations.
15. While a public-domain requirement seems sensible after the government has paid for
the inventive work, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 provides that when researchers working under
government contract create a patentable invention, they are entitled to "first dibs" on the patent.
This policy has been hotly criticized. See Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions:
Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347 (2000).
16. To create trade secret protection, generally speaking, confidentiality agreements are
required of everyone to whom the secret is disclosed. If the secret, despite the agreements
protecting it, is told to someone outside of the firm's circle of confidants, the firm may then
bring an injunction against the wrongful appropriator of the secret information, blocking it from
manufacturing products or carrying out processes that are covered by the trade secret. If a rival
firm acquires the knowledge on its own, without the help of corporate spies or tumcoats, then no
injunction may be brought. Rival firms may either develop the innovation in a completely
independent manner or may "reverse engineer" their competitor's product, figuring out how to
make it based on an analysis of its final form. Either method is perfectly acceptable under law.
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incompatible with a requirement that the innovation pass into the
public domain at some point. Patent regimes currently do this, and
government subsidies and government rewards could. But trade
secrets have no expiration or other mechanism for transference to the
public, so they are a source of either perpetual losses from monopoly
pricing, or, at some point, duplicative R&D expenditures.
Overlap of Legal Incentives-These legal regimes can be mixed
and matched, either in co-extensive applications or as alternatives at
the inventor's option. The exception is that patents and trade secrets
cannot be applied to the same invention. This is because, in receiving
a patent, explicit instructions are released to the public detailing how
to make and use the invention.
B. Anarchic or Quasi-LegalSchemes for Appropriation
Other mechanisms
for incentivizing innovation exist
independently of legislative action, either as regimes that are only
enforced as community-based values, or as regimes that have grown
out of, and depend upon, community-based values. Two general
anarchic incentives are discussed first, followed by a discussion of
two incentive structures that have traditionally been applied to
software, but could be applied to patentable inventions as well. 17
Non-Profits-Non-profit associations may allow for the
appropriation of R&D expenditures, and are especially well-suited to
do so where the social value of an invention exceeds its business
value. Examples include charities that specialize in raising money for
research to fight specific diseases, such as leukemia or muscular
dystrophy. These incentives can be given out to innovators either in
the form of ex post rewards or ex ante research grants.
Pride / Internal Motivation-An internal desire to invent for
self-actualization or pride can also be a powerful non-monetary
incentive to innovation. 18 The romantic image of the inventor
working alone in a laboratory is still a powerful one in American
culture. 19 In the case of freeware-computer programs that are given
freely by their programmers to all other computer users-pride and

17. Software is usually protected by copyright and not by patent, although patent
protection is available in some cases. Copyleft and shareware models are considered here in part
because they are incentives to technological innovation, even if they are not direct competitors
to the current patent regime, and in part because they could be adapted for patentable inventions.
18. See Lloyd Weinreb, Copyrightfor Functional Expression, Ill HARV. L. REv. 1149,
1226 (1998).
19. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy ofIntellectualProperty, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).
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perhaps the desire to hone programming skills are the only incentives
applicable, since any direct monetary reward has been waived.
Copyleft / Patleft-Some computer programmers-known as
"hackers"-use a system called "copyleft," which combines
copyright, contractual licensing, and anarchic values to aid their
system of working as individuals to build large programs with
multiple authors. 20 Hackers retain the copyright in their programs and
distribute them to others only on the condition that they accept a
license requiring those programmers who add to the code to make
their derivative work open to others on the same terms as the license
given to them.2 1 This same scheme-call it "patleft"-could be used
22
with patentable inventions.
Shareware-Forcomputer programs, programmers can release
their programs for free public distribution with a request that those
who use the programs voluntarily pay a licensing fee to the
programmer. While traditionally used for copyrightable works, the
shareware scheme could be used for patentable inventions as well.
C. Business-Basedor ManagerialAppropriationSchemes
Legal scholars studying the patent system often ignore the
considerable incentives for innovation that are provided by business
or market conditions. Returns on R&D can often be finessed through
superior management technique or marketing strategy. 23 As
mentioned above, unlike legal or anarchic incentives, business-based
incentives are morally neutral and often have consequences that are

20. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Symposium: Licensing in the DigitalAge, 36 HOUSTON
L. REv. 179, 185-86 (1999).
21. While copylefi requires the copyright and contract regimes to function, I have placed
it in among anarchic / quasi-legal mechanisms because the values upon which it operates are not
legal. The legal side of copyleft is not a way of coercing those in the hacker community to obey.
It is a means of keeping the non-hacker portion of the population from intruding upon the hacker
community and upsetting its shared ideas about duties and values.
22. A "patleft" regime would be much less tenable because of the time and expense
involved in procuring a patent. Obtaining a patent requires the creation of substantial
documentation, the payment of significant fees, and, in many cases, a substantial volume of
back-and-forth correspondence with the patent office. Compare this to copyrights, for which
legal protection arises upon the act of creation and does not require registration or the payment
of fees.
23. Unfortunately, the reciprocal is true in that business scholarship has tended to neglect
the legal regime when discussing innovation. The effects of this lack of thinking about legal
regimes in business, however, are not limited to scholarship. When business scholars and
professionals fail to fully consider the legal options available, the efficiency of those legal
regimes is altered. See, e.g., the discussion of the disuse of the patent system, infra Part II.C.

278 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 22
unarguably harmful to overall societal welfare. 24 Their discussion is
important here because business-based strategies help to define the
context within which legal mechanisms work. Moreover, where
business-based incentives have negative social-welfare effects, we
may wish to attempt to subvert their operation in the course of
creating legal doctrine and improving the patent system.
These business-based incentives-as they are presented hereoverlap with one another to a considerable extent. This list is not
meant to be comprehensive. Rather, the goal of the list is to illustrate
the kinds of business-borne incentives that can overcome the freerider effect without the additional enticement of governmentmandated or community-created incentive structures. The schemes
are arranged roughly in order from most helpful for social welfare to
the most harmful to social welfare, although such a ranking is made
less meaningful by the considerable overlap among categories.
Lead Time / First-Mover Advantages-Of the business-based
incentives that have been discussed in legal literature, "lead time,"
also referred to as the "first-mover advantage," appears to be the most
often cited. "Lead time" refers to the lag between rival firms with
regard to a certain technology. Lead time can be abetted by the trade
25
secret legal regime-i.e., trade secret can help to preserve lead-time.
Even if the enabling technical information is public knowledge,
however, a rival manufacturer may still lag behind the leader because
it takes time to hire or retrain personnel, to retool or purchase new
equipment, and to change the focus of the firm's managerial and
marketing efforts. The "first-mover" advantage may not dissipate

24. Under most circumstances, it would be better to refer to these "business-based
incentives" as "business-based strategies" for extracting profit from innovation. They can fairly
be called "business-based incentives" because, insofar as the strategies are seen as successful in
appropriating returns from innovation, they will serve as incentives to innovate. They are not,
however, "incentives" in the sense that someone or something has created them with the intent
of inducing innovation. In this sense, business-based "incentives" are distinct from incentives of
the legal regime, such as patents and copyrights, where there is stated intent on the part of
policynakers to provide incentive effect. As the term is used here, "business-based incentives,"
are, for the most part, byproducts of market realities. Freely using the term "business-based
incentives" in this paper emphasizes the comparison of such constructs to legal or societal
incentives. Nonetheless, it is important to avoid the impression that "business-based incentives"
are or were formed from some intent to promote certain conduct.
25. Note also that secret-keeping by a firm is not the same as having a trade-secret legal
regime. Without legal protection for trade secrets, companies could still keep secrets, but they
would have to do so through the goodwill of their employees earned by the carrot of positive
rewards-as opposed to the stick of the trade-secret regime. Even if the goodwill of employees
is minimal, however, secrets kept by a company will at least delay competitors. This will aid the
innovating firm in attaining lead-time and first-mover advantages.
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entirely when new competitors enter the market. The firm that debuts
the new technology may be able to stay ahead of rivals because of its
earlier start. Several factors contribute to keeping such a firm in a
dominant position in the market, including, for instance, a reputation
26
for better quality.
Sales andService Efforts-Many businesses compete not on the
basis of the underlying technology, but on the basis of superior efforts
in sales and service. 27 With such an incentive, the innovation itself is
a more minor reason for customers to purchase a certain item than the
sales-and-service support that goes with it.
Quickness-Some innovating firms are able to appropriate
returns from the technologies they have developed by "moving
quickly down the learning curve." That is, such firms appropriate
greater returns simply by being very quick with improvements and
with the acquisition of know-how about how to use the new
28
technology.
Manufacturing Capacity-A rival firm, seeking to copy
technology from an innovator, may have all the necessary information
about the technology, but without the manufacturing capacity, the
rival will suffer by not being able to get the product to market fast
enough. Gary P. Pisano and Steven C. Wheelwright suggest that if a
firm ensures that product innovation goes hand-in-hand with
manufacturing innovation, that firm will enjoy tremendous
advantages over rivals who must figure out how to get the innovation
to market themselves. 2 9 One way in which innovating businesses can
be sure to take full advantage of this effect is to create crossdisciplinary "tiger teams" that include personnel from manufacturing,
product design, marketing, and finance to take a holistic view of the
project. This kind of holistic understanding would be much more
difficult to achieve for a company that begins by copying the
technology rather than developing it internally.

26. See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 174
(2003).
27. Theoretically, sales-and-service should not be an incentive for innovators, because the
sales-and-service advantages could be applied to a business where there was no need to innovate
(or to the same business, in the case where the innovation was foregone). Nonetheless, managers
cite sales-and-service as a way in which they appropriate returns from R&D. See Richard C.
Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3:1987
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 797, 816.

28. See id. The same logic applies here.
29. See Gary P. Pisano & Steven C. Wheelwright, The New Logic of High-Tech R&D,
HARV. Bus. REV. Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 93.
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Increasing Returns-The strategic concept of increasing returns
is that as some firms scale up-especially new, technology-intensive
firms, as opposed to older, more traditional heavy industry-they will
be able to gather increased returns from marginal sales. 30 In other
words, as companies sell more, they will tend to sell more. The bigger
a market force the company is-the bigger it will get. Increasing
returns is a snowball effect. According to W. Brian Arthur, these
increasing returns can be because of "customer groove-in"-the
unwillingness of a customer to change products because of familiarity
and investments in training. 3 1 Also contributing to increasing returns
are "network effects"-the advantages of buying another product
from the supplier of previous such products because the products
work together in a network. 32 An example of network effects would
be the tendency of people to buy a certain brand of video game
console because their friends already own the same brand of console,
thus allowing the friends to swap games back and forth and use
peripherals interchangeably. The idea of increasing returns is distinct
from the first-mover advantage discussed above: The increasingreturns effect works to the benefit of those who are big-regardless of
whether or not they were first.
Establishing a Proprietary Architecture-If the product that
contains the innovation must work with other products in some sort of
overarching architecture, then controlling that architecture as a
proprietary system allows the better appropriation of investments in
R&D. 33 The best-known example of this is the Microsoft
Corporation, which was able to sell a tremendous amount of
application software because of its control over the dominant
Windows operating system. Charles R. Morris and Charles H.
Ferguson note that these effects may allow inferior technology to be
34
rewarded more greatly than superior technology.
The first-mover advantage and sales-and-service efforts are
societally beneficial incentives in that their beneficiaries rely on
competitive practices to retain the edge that allows them to
appropriate greater profits. Quickness and manufacturing capacity are
also positive from a policy perspective; although their relation to
30. See W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and the New World of Business, HARV. Bus.
REV., July-Aug. 1996, at 100.
31. See id. at 103.
32. See id.
33. See Charles R. Morris & Charles H. Ferguson, How Architecture Wins Technology
Wars, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 86.
34. Id.
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customers is a bit attenuated, learning faster and having the capacity
to get the product to market faster means that there will be better
products, available more quickly. The incentives of increasing returns
and proprietary architectures, however, are more troublesome and
seem to have unfortunate effects on social welfare. Both schemes can
directly lead to customers buying sub-optimal products or services.
D. Why PursuePatentReform?
Considering the foregoing alternatives, patents appear to be an
excellent tool for providing incentives for innovation. Neither other
legal regimes, nor anarchic systems, nor business-based incentives
can completely replace the patent system.
Looking first at only the legal regimes, it is clear that trade secret
is a less-than-optimal solution for all of the innovations it covers
because of the economic losses resulting from the duplicative R&D
and reverse engineering it engenders. With regard to government
subsidies, government rewards, and patent, it may be that the best
solution is a regime that combines all three of these. There are no
characteristics of the three that require any of them to be the exclusive
legal regime. Subsidies may be used when certain social advantages
are desired-such as illuminating dead-end avenues for research and
training greater numbers of researchers. Based on the work of Shavell
and van Ypersele, a regime that allows a choice of patent and
government rewards may be the best. It follows that the existence of a
better patent system allows for a better overall option regime. 3 5
Trade-secret protection might be better eliminated or weakened,
but only if some other form of less costly incentive could replace it.
Currently, trade secret provides incentives for many innovations that
are not patentable. 3 6 Expanding the scope of subject matter protectible
by patents could be such a solution.
In terms of real-world applicability, an overhaul of the patent
system-even if far fetched-is more likely than the implementation
of a rewards system. Steven Calandrillo has suggested that the patent
system may be preferable to the rewards system simply because it is
so entrenched. 37

35. Or at least not a worse one. The option regime would be better with a better patent
system assuming that at least some inventors took advantage of the patent option.
36. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 7.
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Thus, looking only to the alternative legal regimes, both on
practical and theoretical grounds, the betterment of the patent system
deserves considerable attention.
Anarchic / quasi-legal incentives may form important incentives
for innovation, but such a system seems doomed to be incomplete for
all the standard reasons that anarchy is criticized, the foremost being
that it cannot work without a sufficiently close community which
inspires feelings of duty to the group. In our global society, this seems
unlikely to happen generally, although it is clear that it can and does
happen under specific circumstances, such as with people united by
common affliction or within close-knit ad hoc communities. Finally,
even without empirical evidence that anarchic incentives are
incomplete in their stimulation of innovation, from a theoretical
perspective, it would be better to have the alternative of the legal
regime of patent, so long as some innovators took advantage of it.
The business-based incentives discussed above similarly do not
displace a patent regime. First of all, they are clearly incomplete in
the sense that they do not provide proper incentives for all
innovation-i.e., some still fall victim to the free-rider dilemma. Even
worse, some of these mechanisms are clearly harmful to overall social
welfare. Legal regimes, including patent, should be used to mitigate
or eliminate the effect of these harmful business-based mechanisms.
Having established the importance of the patent regime, Part II
examines the problems with the current regime, which we might seek
to change through patent reform.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT PATENT REGIME
This Part discusses two lines of analysis that indicate that there
would be substantial benefit to undertaking reform of the current
patent regime. First, as a matter of logic, patent policy is
presumptively inefficient in terms of the duration of patent protection.
Second, empirical evidence bears out this logical conclusion.
A. The PresumptiveProblem with 20 Years
Unlike the complex and discriminating regulations found in the
tax code or securities regulation, patent law has a marked lack of
sophistication, providing a fixed term of 20 years regardless of the
invention or the industry from which it comes. 38

38. Note, however, that pharmaceutical patents are subject to specially lengthened
durations because of the long process of FDA approval to which pharmaceuticals are subject.
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The duration of patent protection is important because it involves
a trade-off. Traditionally, patent has two objectives: to incentivize
innovation and to encourage its disclosure. The price our society pays
for these benefits is 20 years of monopoly pricing. Assuming that
inventions vary in terms of the costs incurred in producing them and
the benefits they will confer in terms of economic welfare, then it
must be the case that our static 20-year offering price is often wrong.
We must be paying too much or too little for many, if not all,
inventions. Where we pay too much, we unnecessarily lose general
societal wealth to the pockets of inventors. Where we do not offer
enough, we must not be getting all the innovation that we ideally
39
ought to have.
The one-size-fits-all 20-year duration certainly seems arbitrary,
and history proves that it in fact is. Prior to the 20-years-from-filing
duration, U.S. law granted a 17-year term starting on the date the
patent is issued. The origins of this 17-year duration are in the 17thcentury English Statute of Monopolies. The statute set patent length at
14 years, which was the time it took to train two seven-year
apprentice craftsmen. The United States adopted this 14-year length
and added a provision to permit a seven-year extension to 21 years.
Later, Congress eliminated this optional extension and replaced it
with a term of 17 years-the number midway between 14 and 21.40
The 20-year term was adopted to bring the U.S. system into alignment
with the requirements of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs"). 4 1 Because the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office often takes somewhere in the
neighborhood of three years to issue a patent, the effective level of
protection conferred by the 17- and 20-year terms ends up being
42
similar.
39.

See Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length andBreadth, 21 RAND J.

OF EcON. 106 (1990) (Gilbert and Shapiro propose that patent lifetimes should be infinite). See

also text surrounding infra note 92 and infra Appendix.
40. See C. Michael White, Why a Seventeen Year Patent, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 839
(1956).
41. Pub. L. No. 103-465 (Uruguay Round Agreements Act, implementing change from 17
years from issuance to 20 years from application; codified at 35 U.S.C. § 154); see Gerald J.
Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20X, A.D., 38 IDEA 530, 538
(1998).
42. The switch from 17-years-from-issue to 20-years-from-filing has spurred some to
argue that patent terms will be effectively lengthened, while others have argued the switch will
shorten effective patent lifetimes. For a review of the arguments on both sides, see Patricia
Montalvo, Comment, How Will the New Twenty-Year Patent Term Affect You? A Look at the
TRIPs Agreement and the Adoption of a Twenty-Year Patent Term, 12 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER& HIGH TECH. L. J. 139, 155-62 (1996).
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B. Superfluousness of Patents
Empirical data indicates that many patented inventions would
have been developed without the existence of patents. 43 This suggests
that in such cases the availability of patents is inefficient. 44 If they are
unnecessary to create the incentive for the innovation, then their
issuance can only cause losses from monopoly pricing without
offsetting gains in an overall increase in innovation. 45
Economist Edwin Mansfield conducted surveys with business
executives to gain data on how many inventions would not have been
developed without the incentive of patents. His data showed that 65
percent of inventions in pharmaceuticals would not have been
introduced to the market without the incentive of the patent regime. 46
In other industries, including office equipment, motor vehicles,
rubber, and textiles, Mansfield found no evidence that patent
protection was necessary for the development or marketing of any
7
invention. 4
Despite the relative ineffectiveness of patents for appropriating
returns, more than half of patentable inventions were patented
regardless of whether patents were necessary to induce their
development, because such patents were useful as bargaining chips
and as means to delay potential competitors. 48 This is direct evidence
that the patent system is, at least in some circumstances, overly
generous in its rewards, providing incentives beyond the inducement
threshold. Correspondingly, it indicates that the patent system is
causing social welfare loss from the delay of competition and from
tipping the scales in negotiations that would presumably otherwise
reach more efficient results.

43. See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32:2 MGMT.
SC. 173, 180 (1986).
44. Of course, even if the patent award was not a necessary incentive for the innovation
itself, it could still be necessary as an incentive to disclose the invention, rather than hold it as a
trade secret.
45. Judge Richard Posner wrote in a dissent and concurrence to Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 723 F.2d. 1324, 1346 (7th Cir. 1983), that the nonobviousness standard for patentability
should be interpreted such that only inventions which would not have been invented but for the
incentive of a patent should be considered nonobvious. Inventions that would have been
invented anyway are, according Posner, "obvious" under the patent statute.
46. See Mansfield, supra note 43, at 175.
47. See id. at 174-75.
48. Id. at 176.
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C. Disuse of the Patent System
Research also shows that in the case of patentable inventions (as
opposed to patented inventions, discussed above), most such
inventions would have been developed even if patent protection had
not been available. 49 Economic research indicates that patents are the
lifeblood of some industries, such as pharmaceuticals, but are largely
ineffective in other industries, such as electrical equipment, office
equipment, and textiles. 50 This does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that patents ought not to be granted to these latter
industries, but it does indicate a potential weakness of the system. It
may mean that protection should be strengthened through the
lengthening of patent durations for these industries. Where the patent
system is not utilized, there is the potential that greater utilization of
patents would lead to a substantial gain in social welfare by either
increasing innovation or encouraging inventors to eschew trade secret
protection.
III. LEVERS FOR OPTIMIZING THE PATENT SYSTEM

Proposed methods for improving the incentive effects of, and
minimizing the losses associated with, the patent system rely on
manipulating one of the dimensions of patent protection. Most
discussion of patent policy has centered on the manipulation of one or
more of three important levers that control the overall shape of patent
protection: duration, scope, and enforcement. There are other
dimensions, however, such as antitrust law, international geographic
coverage, general economic conditions, and manager attitudes /
business strategy, which ought to be considered along with the
traditional levers. Changes along these dimensions have important
effects on the shape of the overall incentive that patent law provides.
This discussion concludes that, once one accedes to the
proposition that patent law should be reformed, duration is an
excellent choice as a lever for calibrating patent incentives.
A. Levers Available to Us
Duration-The length of protection is the simplest lever for
manipulating the overall reward that patent provides. Most obviously,
the statutory term for patents can be raised or lowered from its current

49. See id. at 176 (many patentable inventions are not patented because firms opt instead
for trade-secret protection).
50. See Levin, supra note 27, at 797.
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20 years. There are more complex changes that can be made to
duration, however, such as altering the event that triggers the start of
the term (from the date of issuance of the patent, for instance, to the
date of filing the application). 5 1 Additionally, duration can be broken
52
up, so that a term is shorter, but with the possibility of extensions.
The extensions could be based on a number of factors, including the
simple willingness to pay extension fees. 53 A more sophisticated
system could impose differential terms based on various
characteristics of inventions and/or their economic properties, or more
specifically, according to the industry or invention class into which
they fall.
Scope-The breadth or scope of a patent is doctrinally much
more complicated than duration. A change in scope can include
modifying the kinds of inventions that can be patented. The move to
approve the patentability of business methods reflects a manipulation
of this variable. 54 Robert Merges and Richard Nelson have noted that
while duration is a matter of settled law, scope is, to a great extent,
under the control of the courts, and therefore provides more promise
55
for creating reform.
Enforcement-The enforceability of patents includes issues
regarding the evidentiary, procedural, and economic hurdles to using
the legal system to stop the infringement of a patent, and what

51. Such a change was made in the United States so that U.S. law would be in compliance
with the terms of the TRIPs agreement-the event triggering the running of the term was
changed from the issuance of the patent to the filing of the application.
52. F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric
Reinterpretation,62 AM. ECON. REV. 422, 427 (1972) (Scherer proposed making extensions
contingent upon a showing of one or more of various economic conditions, such as the market
being small compared to the research costs). Compare this approach to the ex post reward
system of Shavell and van Ypersele, supra Part I.A.2.
53. The U.S. patent system requires maintenance fees of patent holders in order for the
full term of 20 years to be realized. The patent issuance fee only pays for the first four years of
monopoly rights. Progressively larger maintenance fees are required prior to the fifth year, prior
to the ninth year, and prior to the 13th year. These maintenance fees in January 2006 for "large
entities" were $900 for year-5 through year-8, $2,300 for year-9 through year-12, and $3,800 for
year-13 though year-20. See 37 C.F.R. 1.20(e)-(g). Half of those amounts are assessed for
"small entities," which includes individuals and small businesses. See id and 37 C.F.R. 1.27(a).
The maintenance fees may be considered small compared to the costs of prosecuting a patent.
Nonetheless, the fee requirement creates the mild effect of variable patent terms based,
indirectly, on the importance of the invention, with inventions that can attract more capital (and
are therefore presumptively more important) receiving longer terms that those inventions that
cannot.
54. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d. 1368, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
55. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 5, at 839-40.
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remedies are available once infringement has been proven. For
instance, Ian Ayers and Paul Klemperer have proposed that
uncertainty and delay in enforcement are economically beneficial
56
because they help to reduce deadweight loss.

Antitrust Law-The monopoly rights conferred by a patent are
not absolute, and they are restricted in their application by antitrust
law. The greater leeway patent holders have under antitrust law, the
more their monopoly rights will be worth and the greater their overall
reward will be. 57 Louis Kaplow has proposed that permitted practices
that would potentially be outlawed under antitrust law should be

58
permitted where there is a high-incentive-to-loss ratio.

Compulsory Licensing-Laws that allow patent holders to be
compelled to grant licenses to willing manufacturers are another way
in which patent rewards may be shaped. 59 Even though the fees for
compulsory licenses could be set so as to secure the inventor
monopoly profits, the existence of a rival producer of the patented
good could still disadvantage the patent holder. This could happen,
for instance, when the licensee gains manufacturing and marketing
experience during the patent term that allows the licensee to be in a
dominant market position as the patent expires. Otherwise, such a
firm would just be beginning the process of learning to manufacture
and market the invention after the patent expires. In this manner,
compulsory licensing would lower the reward by decreasing the
60
monopoly effects that benefit the patent holder.
Geographic Coverage / Internationalization-The international
expansion of the availability of patent protection through TRIPs and
other agreements is perhaps the most important contemporary
manipulation of patent rewards.
Economic Conditions-As with any other economic topic,
macroeconomic variables will change the parameters of a
microeconomic model. As the economy expands, less R&D will

56. Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97
MICH. L. REv. 985, 986-87 (1999).
57. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 1813, 1824 (1984).
58. Id. at 1824.
59. See Pankaj Tandon, Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 90:3 J. OF POL.
ECON. 470 (1982).
60. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (compulsory licensing scheme under the U.S. Copyright
Act allowing musical artists to make "cover versions" of published musical compositions).
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provide greater returns, regardless of legal variables. 6 1 Likewise,
when the economy is poor, the subsequent reward from R&D will
fall.
Business and Management Conditions-The attitudes, fashions,
training, and psychology of business managers may also have a large
impact on the real-world effects of the patent system. Concluding that
patents were largely ineffective as incentives in many industries,
Richard C. Levin et al. questioned why firms pursued patents
anyway. 62 One explanation they offered is that patents may be used as
a means to measure the performance of employees involved in
R&D. 63 For start-ups looking for financing, patents have been cited as
performing an important signaling function, indicating to venturecapital firms that some start-ups have better potential than their rivals.
These business attitudes toward patents and patent holders may or
may not be rationally based.
B. Why Choose Patent Duration?
One of the chief advantages of manipulating duration rather than
another lever lies in duration's doctrinal simplicity. Changing
duration is not the complicated affair that changing the scope or
enforcement of patents would be. Manipulation of scope requires
changing doctrines of what inventions are patentable or the rights to
which someone is entitled once they are given a patent. One can
theoretically discuss lowering the nonobviousness requirement, for
example, by 50 percent, but expressing such a change in a way that it
could be implemented would be complex. Manipulation of
64
enforcement is doctrinally complicated in a similar manner.
Burk and Lemley have encouraged courts to embrace a
policymaking role in patent law by developing an approach of
differential application of doctrines to different technologies and
industries. 65 For example, Burk and Lemley urge that small-molecule

61. The effect of favorable economic conditions is especially powerful when combined
with the globalization of patent protection, since it involves both an expansion of markets and an
increase in the economic power of each one of those markets.
62. See Levin, supra note 27, at 798.
63. See id.
64. In a regime of public enforcement, a policy maker could simply enlarge or shrink the
budget of enforcement personnel. But in a regime of primarily private enforcement-as is the
case with patent-the manipulation of the level of such private enforcement would require
changing the law, such as by changing the rules of litigation procedure in patent cases.
65. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575
(2003).
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chemistry needs fewer patents that are broader in scope to properly
encourage innovation. To accomplish this, they suggest that courts
strengthen the doctrine of equivalents for small-molecule chemicals
while relaxing the requirement that the patent applicant fully disclose
how to make and use the invention. 66 Burk and Lemley's prescription
could raise a host of troubles. First, the more complicated a solution
is, the more error prone it will be. Using a wide array of patent
doctrines, any one of which may be manipulated in multiple ways,
introduces needless opportunity for blunder. Doctrinal changes may
be misunderstood by courts attempting to apply precedent.
Additionally, such changes may have unforeseen consequences
through interaction with other doctrines or by being applied in
different factual contexts. Another problem with the approach of
policymaking by the courts is that it promises to take too longespecially here, where the goal is to calibrate incentives to innovate.
Evolving the law through shifting jurisprudence is-and should be-a
slow process. Courts take small steps, building on the work of other
opinions. Even watershed cases announcing significant departures
from prior doctrine can create more questions than answers, requiring
a round of observer commentary and subsequent judicial opinions
before people understand what the impact will be. The need to
incentivize more innovation in a certain research sector may have
dissipated by the time the doctrine is developed and understood and
before its impact has been felt in industry.
The numeric quality of duration is also advantageous in that it
allows for fine-tuning of the system. Doctrines of scope or
enforcement can be reworded or switched on and off, but duration has
the prospect of allowing infinite gradations in making the slight
adjustments to the size of the patent reward.
Furthermore, the simple numeric quality of duration means that
the effects of its manipulation would be more predictable than
manipulation of other variables would be. While changing an
evidentiary presumption or a doctrine of claim interpretation could
have unforeseeably mild or extreme effects, tinkering with the
duration of patents is not similarly worrisome. Changing the duration
from 20 years to 19.8 years would be slight enough that one could
predict with confidence that the resulting change in R&D investment
would be minute. Duration has a comfortable quality of facilitating an
"ease in" to change, in part because it allows for on-going
experimentation and adjustment with minimal risk.
66.

See id. at 1686-87.
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IV. PAST AND CURRENT DIFFERENTIATION OF PATENT DURATION

The idea of issuing patents of various durations is not new. There
have been various proposals for differentiated durations for categories
of patents, and, under existing laws in the United States and abroad,
there are many examples of varying durations for patents and patentlike sui generis intellectual-property rights.
In the United States, pharmaceutical patents provide an example
of patents with a different duration. The Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 198467 took pharmaceuticals out of
the general milieu of uniform patent terms. Because the Food and
Drug Administration requires lengthy trials and studies before
approving drugs for market, the effective life of pharmaceutical
patents was half of the then-current statutory term of 17 years. 68 To
restore some of this loss, the 1984 legislation adjusted the duration of
pharmaceutical patents according to a formula whose inputs are the
FDA review time and clinical testing time. One study estimated that
the act added about three years to the useful life of the average
pharmaceutical patent, resulting in an effective patent life of 11.8
years. 69 Thus, even with the special extension afforded by the 1984
law, the effective life of drug patents is of shorter duration than other
U.S. patents, yet the pharmaceutical industry nonetheless finds
patents to be highly effective in appropriating returns from R&D. 70
Where the pharmaceutical industry, one of the most patentadvantaged industries, maintains tremendous incentive to innovate
despite having patent duration effectively shortened by approximately
one-third, there is strong reason to believe that the incentive provided
by the patent system may be much more than is necessary for this or
other industries.
Plant patents in the U.S. system, which protect asexually
reproduced plant varieties, have the same term as utility patents-20
years from the date of application. But the Plant Variety Protection
Act provides a different, longer term of patent-like protection to
sexually reproduced varieties 71-20 years from the date of issuance

67. Pub. L. No. 98-417 (patent extension provisions codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156).
68. See Grabowski & Vernon, Longer Patents for Lower Imitation Barriers: The 1984
DrugAct, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 195 (1986).
69. See id. at 197. One should note that the change in patent duration was part of a
package of reforms that also increased the ability of rival drug manufacturers to make and sell
generic equivalents to brand-name drugs after the expiration of the relevant patents.
70. See Levin, supra note 27; see also Mansfield, supra note 43.
71. 7 U.S.C. § 2321, et seq. (2000).
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for most plants, and for trees and vines-which are slower to
72
mature-the term is 25 years from the date of issuance.
Other countries have had variable durations for patents. The
German system once carried a full term for a major patent and a three73
year term for a minor patent, renewable at successively higher fees.
In 1950, in the era before TRIPs, the Swiss system provided for a
maximum patent duration of 15 years after the filing of the
application for all inventions except pharmaceuticals and chemicals,
74
which were accorded patent protection of not longer than 10 years.
Egypt, Kuwait, and Libya limited patent protection for
pharmaceuticals to 10 years as late as 1999, even though these
countries all had a 15-year term that started running with the filing of
the application for patents generally. 75 Historically some countries
provided government officials with the discretion to extend patent
durations for inventions that were considered to be especially
76
important.
Proposals for and experiments with petty patents are another
77
example of differential terms for different kinds of inventions.
Australia provides a shorter term of protection to inventors who desire
a less expensive and faster method for obtaining patent protection. 7 8
Within the United States, the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
of 1984 creates special protection for the etched designs on
microprocessor chips. 79 Although the protection provided by this act
is not patent protection per se, because the act is designed to
incentivize technology innovation, it is a relevant example of
differing terms of protection based on the nature of the innovation.
The act, aimed at the fast-moving computer industry, provides for a
10-year term of protection. 80 On the software side of the computer
industry, some commentators have called for shorter durations for

72. 7 U.S.C. § 2483(b) (2000).
73. See Howard Gensler, Property Law as an Optimal Economic Foundation, 35
WASHBURN L.J. 50 (1995).
74. See Josh Lerner, Supplemental Material on the Evolution of Global Patent Policy,
http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlemer/PatPolSum.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
75. See id.
76. See idat 15.
77. See generally, Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection,40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 151
(1999).
78. See id. at 165-66.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 902, et seq. (2000).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 904 (2000).
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software patents, in part because the software business is so fast
moving. 8 1
As a proposed change to patent duration for a specific field of
innovation, Amazon.com CEO Jeff Bezos-under fire from many in
the Internet community for Amazon's patent on "1-click ordering"posted a letter in which he called for shorter durations for business
82
method patents and software patents.
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING PATENT LIFETIMES

Once we have decided that the 20-year term is presumptively
unfit and that revising it is a potentially significant source of societal
benefit, then there are several ways in which we can tackle its reform.
Broadly speaking, each of our proposed solutions could be placed into
one of two categories: (1) incomplete or ad hoc fixes that suggest only
relative values of patent protection-i.e., an up-or-down movement
in duration-or (2) comprehensive systems that suggest absolute
values for patent duration. In this latter "comprehensive" category,
there are both substantive and procedural levels on which we could
view the problem. Both are discussed.
Proceeding on the substantive level, the most straightforward
avenue for progress in finding absolute values would be to create or
adopt an economic model to tell us what the optimal life of a patent
would be, given certain inputs, and then gather empirical data
corresponding to those inputs. By running the empirical data through
the model, we should be able to find discrete patent categories to
which we could attach differing lifetimes. These categories should
have two properties: 1) The categories should group inventions that
share economic characteristics that are determinants of optimal patent
life according to the model, and 2) the categories should be
straightforward and clear enough so that patents can be assigned to a
category at the time of issuance with little wiggle room for litigation
or administrative appeal. With categories constructed in this way, and
with a proper model and the proper empirical data, we should be able
to prescribe carefully targeted durations for each category.
81. See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protectionfor Computer Software, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 1329, 1364-65 (1987).
82. See Jeff Bezos, An Open Letter from Jeff Bezos on the Subject of Patents (Mar. 9,
2000), available at http://www.oreilly.com/news/amazonpatents.htm (last visited Jan. 8,
2006); see also Troy Wolverton, Amazon CEO Sees Solutions in Patent Reform, CNET
NEWS.COM (Mar. 9, 2000), availableat
http://news.com.com/Amazon+CEO+sees+solutions+in+patent+reform/2100-1017_3237801.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
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Unfortunately, the empirical data that is available does not provide all
83
the necessary inputs for the models that have been created.
We can also view the problem of establishing absolute values on
a procedural level. That is, instead of focusing on the substantive
answer to what the categories are and what the duration for each
should be, we might instead propose a process for setting such values.
This line of analysis shows much more promise. It may be, and
appears to be the case currently, that prescribing specific values is
beyond the scope of any academic effort. Perhaps substantive
prescriptions should be created only through the outcome of some
real-world process. Discussed below are several possibilities for such
real-world processes.
A. Ad hoc Relativistic Manipulationof Patent Durations
Postponing the problem of finding absolute values, first
discussed are "ad hoc" policies that are based on observations about
the levers that control the overall reward provided by the patent
84
regime.
i. Where Globalization Increases, Patent Durations Should
Decrease
All other things being equal, evolving expansion of international
patent protection militates in favor of a contraction of duration. As
discussed in Part II, the aggregate action of various international
treaties has created a general trend of increasing the territory included
in patent protection. This globalization results in a larger market in
which an inventor may appropriate returns from innovative R&D. A
larger market, in turn, means a greater financial reward is available to
the monopoly-rights holder. Because of the special nature of
intellectual property, this leads to the conclusion that the patent
reward should be decreased to offset this market-territory expansion.
This analysis suggests that the globalization of patent protection has

83. See discussion infra Part III.B.
84. Discussed in supra Part II. Tradeoffs between antitrust and patent duration are
discussed by Kaplow, supra note 57. His observation and accompanying policy guidelines are
another example of ad hoc patent manipulation in addition to the ones mentioned here. The
difference is that the ad hoc manipulations described here are ones in which the non-patent
levers either cannot or should not be manipulated, making it clear that patent duration (or some
other patent lever) ought to be manipulated to offset the effect. With regard to the intersection of
patent and antitrust law, there seems to be no reason to choose the manipulation of patent
durations to offset changes in antitrust law, since both are under the control of Congress and the
federal courts.
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amounted to a free ride for patent-holding firms. 8 5 Lower patent
86
durations would be a convenient means for achieving this offset.
Begin with the observation that R&D is not economically
scalable. In other words, R&D is made up almost exclusively of fixed
costs with little or no variable costs. The cost of developing a new
form of computer memory, for instance, is the same whether the
resulting product is sold only in the United States or whether it is sold
on all continents. 87 Assume, arguendo, that in the United States, the
term of protection for computer memory inventions were correctly
calibrated. If this were the case, the system would be offering the
proper amount of incentive and inducing the proper amount of
innovation. Now that patent protection has expanded overseas, there
is a greater reward for each patentee. This must lead either to too
much innovation, draining resources away from other sectors of the
economy, or to the same amount of innovation, but with an
unnecessary loss to social welfare because of an inefficiently long or
wide monopolization from the patent.

85. As a political matter, it is clear that patent-intensive firms have a powerful interest in
attaining and retaining this globalization advantage, even if it is not socially beneficial. Because
of the strength of such special interests, and because TRIPs is a fait accompli at this point,
providing for a minimum duration of 20 years, the prospects for changing this system are, of
course, low. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 33,
Apr. 15, 1994,1869 U.N.T.S 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197.
86. One caution to note in lowering patent durations to coincide with increased
globalization is that not all inventors seek overseas patents. Even those who do may not chose to
seek a patent in every jurisdiction that offers one. Patent prosecution can be an expensive
process, and obtaining a patent in a country with a small market for the invention may not be
worthwhile. For such inventors, a U.S. patent, or patents in a handful of important jurisdictions,
may provide enough incentive to innovate without the availability of patents in other countries.
To account for the effects of these transaction costs in obtaining patents in other jurisdictions,
patent duration could be incrementally lowered for each overseas patent obtained, but lowered
by a small enough amount that there would continue to be incentive to patent in overseas
jurisdictions. Under such a system, an innovating firm that held only a U.S. patent would have a
full term, and consumers outside the United States would reap a social welfare benefit of
gaining innovation without offsetting monopoly pricing. On the other hand, an innovating firm
that held patents in many jurisdictions would receive a somewhat lowered period of protection
in all of them, providing for social welfare gains for consumers in the years during which the
patents would have been enforceable but for the term shortening occasioned by multijurisdiction patenting. Finally, it should be noted that if the trend toward globalization advances
to the point that patents are available in all or many jurisdictions with only insignificant
transaction costs, then there would be no need to couple lowering of duration to the extent of
multi-jurisdiction patenting for a given invention.
87. There are, of course, laboratory and legal expenses incurred in certifying products for
other countries, most notably drugs, but these expenditures are probably better thought of as
marketing costs than as R&D costs, at least for our purposes here. The legal and regulatory
expenses incurred for international expansion serves only to lower the marginal gain from
expansion, not to change the financial analysis of the underlying R&D.
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The geographic coverage of the patent itself is an unlikely place
to look for inefficiency, since globalization presumably leads to
greater efficiency through economies of scale and via effects
predicted by the theory of competitive advantage. 88 Thus, the proper
place to correct the inefficiency is in the manipulation of the duration

of patents.
The proper adjustment

for duration of patents

vis-a-vis

globalization of patent protection would be easy to determine. One
needs only to calculate the size of the increase in the marketprobably through a measure such as gross domestic product-and

then make an adjustment upwards in protection to offset the costs
associated with launching a product in a new country. Reasonable
approximations of these costs would not pose a difficulty for
empirical research.
ii. Patent Durations Should be Responsive to Changes in
Macroeconomic Conditions
It was observed above that in a poor economy, the same amount
of R&D spending will produce lesser returns, all else being equal,
than when the economy is expanding. What are the policy
implications of this observation? We might attempt to index patent
protection to key economic indicators. This would allow the ongoing
calibration of the patent system so that rewards from R&D would be
insulated from cyclical downturns and reined-in during a period of
heated economic expansion. 89 Of course, the changing of patent
88. It may be the case, however, that because of the differing economic conditions of
various countries that the more efficient solution would be to not have patent protection for
foreign inventions in some lesser-developed countries, since the incentives can come from
developed countries that can better afford them. The efficient solution may not be reached
through treaty negotiations because of the tremendous bargaining advantage that developed
nations wield on behalf of their intellectual-property intensive constituents.
89. In regards to relating patent length to economic variables, Frank Partnoy has done
work on integrating interest rates into models of optimal patent length. See Frank Partnoy,
Financeand PatentLength, U. San Diego Law & Econ Research Paper No. 19 (2001), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract--285144 (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). He suggests that lower interest
rates indicate lower optimal patent terms, and higher interest rates indicate longer optimal patent
terms. See id. at 18. The higher that interest rates rise, the longer patent terms will need to be to
provide adequate incentives. Partnoy's models indicate that a one-percent shift in interest rates
roughly results in a one-year shift in the optimal patent term. See id. at 5. Parmoy's analysis of
interest rates and patent terms, however, does not address the question of what other economic
factors accompany changing interest rates. Central banks may raise or lower interest rates to
offset undesirable macroeconomic conditions, such as inflation, excessive borrowing, depressed
business or consumer spending, etc. These conditions themselves may affect the inventive
activity of innovating firms. Therefore, tying patent terms to interest rates should be considered
within the context of other economic variables to which interest rates move in reaction.
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durations would not merely serve to insulate industries, but would
have its own economic effects. 9 0
A more germane and promising application of changing patent
durations would be to discriminate among industrial sectors. 9 1 One
might look for persistent inter-industry differences in economic
conditions, and then award longer patent protection for inventions that
serve economic sectors with a decreased ability to pay and award
shorter patent protection for inventions that serve wealthy economic
sectors with better underlying economic conditions. Before pursuing
such a policy, of course, we would have to consider that the reason
for differences in underlying economic conditions may be due to the
desirable effects of market-driven transfer of capital from less
economically important sectors to sectors with a greater promise for
increasing bottom-line societal welfare.
Keeping in mind this reservation, changing patent durations
among industries could be fruitful where some industries are
characterized by highly elastic demand curves and thus are more
vulnerable to cyclical economic effects. One specific example is an
industrial sector that is characterized by a large proportion of cashpoor start-up companies. Higher patent durations might help allay the
concerns of skittish venture-capital firms during economic downturns.
An international application of this idea might be that for countries
that are attempting to incubate industrial sectors, a higher patent
duration would shield young R&D-intensive firms from changing
economic conditions that could cause capital to evaporate.
Suppose, for example, spending on consumer electronics is down, and interest rates have been
lowered to boost consumer spending. In such a situation, one would have to question whether it
would be advisable to lower patent incentives for the already depressed consumer electronics
industry. One could imagine that larger patent incentives, provided through longer terms, might
produce "gotta have it" innovations that would precipitate a boost to consumer spending.
90. One could imagine using patent durations as a general device for alternately heating
up and cooling off the economy when prudent. Such a device would probably be inferior to
manipulation of interest rates because the mechanism of interest rates has a more immediate and
far-reaching effect. Holders of stock in patent-intensive corporations could respond immediately
to the announcement of a patent duration increase or decrease, but the actual effect on corporate
profits would take years to materialize. And, of course, patent-intensive companies are only a
segment-although a large one-of the economy. Interest rates, on the other hand, affect every
company and investor, and the investment decisions that are based on interest rates are
immediate. Thus, the economy would respond much more quickly to changes in interest rates
than patent-duration changes.
91. Partnoy analyzes the differential structure of cash flows of returns from innovation
among types of inventions and concludes that such differences indicate that terms should vary
among industries accordingly. See Partnoy, supra note 89, at 22-27. Specifically, Partnoy's
analysis supports a conclusion that financial-services patents should have shorter durations than
those for pharmaceuticals. See id. at 26-27.
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B. Substantive Prescriptionsfor Categoriesand Durations
As opposed to the above-discussed "ad hoc" mechanisms for
reforming patent duration, making substantive prescriptions for
optimal patent life requires a model, workable categories, and
empirical data.
i.

Models for Optimal Patent Life

Substantial literature has focused on the question of what the
optimal length of patents should be. 9 2 In general, the topic has
received considerably more attention from microeconomists than
from legal scholars. Economists have developed various models to
calculate optimal patent life. Even without empirical data to fill them
out, these economists have been able to make some predictions about
general situations that call for a relatively longer patent life.
Unfortunately, the economists' results are often at odds with one
another.
William Nordhaus developed models of optimal patent life using
inputs such as cost of R&D and the social value of inventions. His
work indicated that optimal patent life is extremely sensitive to
changes in elasticity of demand, the discount rate, and the size (or
importance) of the invention that is being considered. Depending on
these values, his equations show an optimal lifetime ranging from 1.1
to 34 years. 93 Part of this sensitivity, he maintained, was because of
the flatness of the welfare function he used. Once a patent reached a
life of between six and 10 years, the welfare function flattened,
indicating that as patent lifetimes are lengthened, there is little effect
on social welfare, as he defines it. He notes that this is not the case for
very important inventions, for which social welfare losses are greater
as patent terms are lengthened.
Nordhaus's modeling indicates that although optimal patent life
may change greatly depending on the industry, kind of invention, and
even outside economic circumstances, the life of a patent may not

92. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (MIT Press 1969); F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus' Theory
of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1972); Pankaj
Tandon, Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 90 J. OF POLITICAL ECON. 470 (1982);
Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. OF ECON.
106 (1990); Paul Klemperer, How broad should the scope of patent protection be?, 21 RAND J.
OF ECON. 113 (1990); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1813 at 1823 (1984).
93. See Nordhaus, supra note 92, at 81-82.
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matter much as long as it is greater than a certain number of years,
which, depending on the variables, ranges from six to 10 years. 94
Of course, the practical value of Nordhaus's work considered
alone is quite limited, since he admits to having very little confidence
in the empirical information that he uses with the model.
Additionally, Nordhaus gives us reasons to believe that finding highconfidence empirical data would be very difficult. 95 According to
Nordhaus, "easy inventions," meaning those that yield a large benefit
relative to R&D costs, deserve a shorter duration of patent
96
protection.
Following up on the work of Nordhaus, F.M. Scherer attempted
to refine and simplify Nordhaus's model. 9 7 Recognizing that there is
considerable difficulty in applying this model to patent reform, since
an ex ante calculation of social welfare value is impracticable or
impossible, Scherer proposed a flexible system in which patentees
would initially be given a shorter term, but might be granted an
extension if they could meet the burden of proving that their invention
deserved greater protection because of R&D costs and social
welfare. 98 The transaction costs associated with this method would be
very large, of course, and such a system would need to inspire enough
confidence in inventors that they would believe they would be well
compensated for deserving inventions.
Another theoretical perspective is one offered by Richard Gilbert
and Carl Shapiro, who introduced analysis of patent scope alongside
duration. 9 9 Their models assume that there is a trade-off between
duration and scope-an increase in "scope" meaning greater offensive
rights against a greater range of products or processes. The trade-off,
according to Gilbert and Shapiro, is that a longer duration will
compensate an inventor for a narrowing of scope, and a larger scope
will compensate an inventor for a shorter duration. Because Gilbert
and Shapiro found that any incremental increase in scope had greater
deleterious effects on social welfare than the offsetting increment of
duration, they concluded that an infinite duration may be optimal, as
it minimizes the patent's scope. 100
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
thinking.

See id. at 83-84.
See id. at 86.
See id. at 79.
See Scherer, supra note 92.
See id at 427.
See Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 92.
See id. Two things to note: First, Kaplow demonstrates the economic fallacy of this
See supra, note 57, at 1826-28. Second, because inventors and corporate stockholders
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As discussed above, ideally these models would work with
inputs of reasonably ascertainable information and provide
differential results for categories that are clear enough for the
placement of inventions ex ante, and with a minimum of potential for
dispute about the categories to which the inventions ought to belong.
Nordhaus's and Scherer's models are not very helpful in this regard.
They depend upon inputs such as the importance of the invention,
which is difficult or impossible to calculate ex ante, and which would
likely involve expensive litigation or administrative costs if calculated
ex post.
ii. Finding the Proper Categories
The difficulty in calculating the inputs for the theoretical
treatment of optimal patent life is also at the root of the problem in
assigning inventions to sensible categories. Where an input is difficult
to calculate ex ante, it is correspondingly unhelpful in dividing
inventions into groups.
In fact, there has been little scholarly attention as to what
differential categories might serve the purpose of better calibrating
the patent system. As the above discussed models propose, we might
try to divide inventions into different categories based on their
underlying economic characteristics (such as costs involved and
surplus generated) and/or their technological characteristics (such as
how much of a breakthrough they are). The problem with these
categories is that they require information that is difficult, expensive,
or even impossible to obtain in advance of the invention's
introduction to the market.
Industrial sectors, however, show promise as helpful categories.
Industries differ greatly from one another in technological progress,
including the rate of progress and the sources of innovation. 10 1 It is
well accepted among economists that technological opportunity-the
ease and inexpensiveness with which new innovation can be
pursued--differs from industry to industry. 102 Because of this, the

of inventing firms have finite lifetimes, an infinite patent provides no more incentive that a
patent that lasts approximately 100 to 200 years. This conclusion follows from theoretical
evolutionary biology. Please see the Appendix for a fuller explanation.
101. See Pari Patel and Keith Pavitt, Patterns of Technological Activity: Their
Measurement and Interpretation, in Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and
Technological Change 15, 33 (1995).
102. See Wesley Cohen, Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity, in Handbook of the
Economics of Innovation and Technological Change 183, 214 (1995). See also Ashish Arora et
al., "R&D, Knowledge Spillovers, and Competitions among Firms with Asymmetric

300 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L... [Vol. 22
patent system will have different incentive effects in different
industries. 10 3 Incidental to empirical economic work, some scholars
have suggested that evaluation of the patent system ought to be done
on an industry-by-industry basis. These investigating economists have
usually used SIC codes-standardized industrial classifications-to
define these industries. Because there is economic evidence to suggest
that there is considerable variation in the characteristics of innovation
from one industry to another, industrial categories have considerable
appeal.
Unfortunately, there is a substantial amount of variation within
broad industry classifications. Starting, however, from an arbitrary
20-year duration for basically all categories of invention, any division
into sensible categories, no matter how large, would still tend toward
better economic efficiency.
Aside from industrial sectors, there are other possibilities for
categories. The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office uses a six-digit class
/ subclass scheme to catalog all inventions in order to facilitate future
searches for anticipatory prior art during the examination process.
Using this cataloging system, or something similarly complex, as a
basis for varying patent durations would provide a much sharper
economic stylus than SIC categories would. A new antibiotic, a new
pain reliever, and an improvement in microencapsulation technique
for oral drug delivery are all pharmaceutical-industry inventions, but
they all have very different markets and therefore would presumably
have different ideal incentive structures. This variation in incentives,
of course, indicates that differential patent durations across these
categories would be beneficial. One should note that, unfortunately,
the TRIPs agreement forbids reducing patent protection based on
fields of technology. Therefore, reforms of this type would require
modification of TRIPs. 104 There is no barrier, however, to extending
protection for certain categories of inventions.
iii. Empirical Research
There has been substantial empirical economic research into the
effectiveness of patents in allowing firms to appropriate returns from
Technological Capabilities," HEINZ SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT WORKING PAPER, available at
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/wpapers/detail.jsp?id=l 31 (last visited Jan. 8, 2006) (explaining how
the different dynamics of knowledge spillover among industries affects the incentives those
industries have to innovate).
103. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System
and ControversialTechnologies, 47 MD. L. REv. 1051, 1057-58 (1988).
104. See Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 41 at 538.
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their R&D investments, as well as into inter-industry differences in
innovation. 105 Multiple empirical studies have confirmed that patents
are highly effective in appropriating returns in only certain
industries. 10 6 This kind of data, however, provides only part of the
equation. As was illustrated with the above-discussed economic
models, optimization of the patent system requires information on
social welfare loss from monopoly pricing, as well as information on
what constitutes the inducement threshold-the bare minimum
amount of protection required to cause the firm to produce the desired
innovation. Because of these limitations, current empirical data does
not match up with theoretical models to provide a complete toolkit for
making prescriptions about patent life.
Richard C. Levin and others have conducted considerable
research on the effectiveness of patents in various industries. 107 In
presenting their data, they have urged that patent policy be scrutinized
on an industry-by-industry basis. 108 While robust in terms of the
breadth and depth of the sample, Levin's research is limited in that it
only provides a picture of how effective patents are for firms seeking
to appropriate maximum returns on their R&D investments.
At least in serving the purposes of prescribing differential patent
durations, there are some serious shortcomings in the empirical
research conducted thus far. First, the research concentrates on the
effectiveness of patents in appropriating returns on R&D, which,
although substantially related to incentives to innovate, is not
identical. This is the case first because past returns on R&D are only
one factor for determining the desirability of undertaking certain
R&D. Other factors may include perceived differences in future
returns and reasons for getting patents other than appropriation of
R&D. Therefore, incentives and appropriability can diverge. 109
Second, and more importantly, incentives are only one side of the
patent policy equation; the other issue is the loss to social welfare
caused by the monopoly pricing and deadweight loss.

105. See generally Cohen, supra note 102, at 226.
106. See Levin, supra note 27; Mansfield, supra note 43; see also Cohen, supra note 102.
107. See Levin, supra note 27.
108. Seeid. at816.
109. These can include entry to foreign markets and evaluation of inventive-employee
performance. See Mansfield, supranote 43, at 176.
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iv. Models, Categories, and Empirical Research Considered
Together
At this time there exists no model, appropriate categories, and
empirical data that will all work together to provide a complete
solution to finding optimal durations for patents. We must either wait
for the day when academic economists will make advancements on
the empirical or theoretical fronts that will allow a complete solution,
or we must look outside of academia for a real-world process that will
compile and synthesize the information for us.
C. ProceduralPrescriptionsfor FindingAppropriateDurations
Surrendering, for the time being, the battle for a combination of
empirical data and theoretical modeling that would provide
substantive answers, there is promise in investigating the feasibility of
a decision-making paradigm that will do that work for us. Such a
system needs not only some guarantee of accuracy, but also
credibility and political strength in order to be effective. There are a
number of possibilities for such a system, many of which could be
combined with others. The list below is not meant to be exhaustive,
but is meant instead to highlight certain points along a spectrum of
procedural schemes.
i.

Legislative Democratic Process

We could open up the matter of patent durations to Congress (or
other legislatures in other countries), who, through normal means of
assignment to committee and public hearings, could create categories
of invention and prescribe durations for them. 110 This is unlikely to
happen, as Congress ordinarily tries to avoid such regulatory finetuning, preferring instead to delegate that responsibility to
administrative agencies. Additionally, direct congressional action
would also be undesirable because, given the economic characteristics
of the problem, Congress is highly likely to come up with the wrong
result.
Congress is good at creating compromises among political power
interests. Not all the players in an optimal patent system, however,
would come to Washington to testify before Congress, and even if
they did, many would be crippled in terms of credibility. The public at
large and consumers of various innovation products bear the brunt of
110. Cf Partnoy, supra note 89, at 29-33 (discussing Congress setting"different durations
for different industries).
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patent-protected monopoly pricing, so the interests of society as a
whole are likely to lose out to special interests on Capitol Hill who
are armed with considerable lobbying power. Without sufficient input
representing consumers of innovation and society at large, the
democratic process is likely to prescribe more protection than is
efficient for overall welfare. Rich clients can hire the best lobbyistsand the best lobbyists often can bend the law to the desire of their
clients.
Furthermore, there is likely to be an imbalance in the kinds of
firms that would involve themselves in the lobbying effort.
Established R&D-intensive firms are likely to be on the first plane to
Washington, pushing for higher levels of protection to increase the
returns on their R&D investments.
Unlikely to be heard are market entrants, a category that includes
both established firms coming from other industries and
entrepreneurial start-up ventures. These waiting-in-the-wings
competitors may have an important effect on prices and
competition-even before these competitors fully materialize. Yet in
their inchoate state they will not, of course, be able to wage much of a
lobbying effort. Entrants may be interested either in shorter or longer
periods of patent duration, depending on their circumstances. In some
situations, patents may be used by established firms to prevent startups and other entrants from competing. Start-up ventures, however,
may have a special interest in patent protection for themselves,
because the other tools for appropriating returns from R&D, such as
investments in sales-and-service efforts and quick ramping up for
production to ensure lead time, may not be available to cash-poor
start-ups. 1 1 1

Occupying a space between established R&D-intensive firms
and unmaterialized start-ups is the category of companies that are not
originators of R&D, but are instead skilled absorbers of it.112 These
firms, existing in large numbers outside the United States, can
specialize in copying successful electronics or pharmaceutical
designs. They serve an important function in taking a growth-oriented
leading-edge technology and turning it into a commodity with lower
margins, thus providing greater accessibility to consumers.
Commodity-oriented copying enterprises are also likely to be
underrepresented in terms of Capitol Hill power.

I 11.
112.

See Levin, supra note 27, at 797.
See Cohen, supranote 102, at 230.
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Potentially offsetting the lack of lobbying from firms in weaker
positions could be the existence of a collective-action problem for
established industry players, since spending money on lobbying, at
least in this instance, is money spent helping an entire industrial
sector, including one's competitors. This would probably not be a
problem for oligopolistic sectors where relatively few multi-national
corporations control the market-such as with oil or pharmaceuticals.
The benefits accruing to individual companies would be so high, and
the costs of lobbying so low, that all oligopoly players would likely
participate.
ii. Administrative Lawmaking
National legislatures could delegate the determination of patent
durations and the boundaries of categories to a politically insulated
administrative lawmaking process. The advantages of this method
would be that the agency would be less affected by the political
power-imbalance between large R&D firms on one hand and
consumers and R&D-absorbing firms on the other hand. Even then,
however, the agency would have limited information upon which to
make decisions about what the patent duration should be. As
discussed, there are substantial shortcomings in current modeling and
empirical research for custom tailoring patent durations. That being
said, the agency might be able to adjust the patent term for some
industries or categories of invention up or down in a relative sense,
for which the models do seem to provide some basis.
The agency could and would, of course, hear public comment
from interested parties. The above-noted problems in bringing some
key players into the process, however, would persist. One possible
solution would be to hire management consultants and lawyers to
represent the interests of absent parties-that is, the consuming public
at large, market entrants, and commoditizing R&D-absorbing firms.
Entrepreneurial firms might be well-represented by the venturecapital industry, but because venture capital can be very spread out,
there are collective action problems associated with VC firms
spending significant time negotiating on behalf of future clients.
iii. Trade Consortia and Negotiated Patent Durations
Traditional law-and-economics theory tells us that if we get the
interested parties into negotiation with one another, and there are no
interfering conditions such as information disadvantages and
irrational negotiating behavior, then we ought to reach an optimal
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result. Could we do the same for patent durations? If the patent
categories were set in advance, then the trick would be getting all the
affected actors to the negotiating table. 113
This negotiation process would have problems similar to those
faced by legislative or administrative lawmaking processes. With
many inventions, an entire chain of consumers might be represented
by the first consumer in the distribution chain after the patent holder.
For instance, if the invention were an improvement in hard-drive
read-write heads, then manufacturers of hard drives could represent
customers further down in the distribution chain. Getting
representatives for entrants is a more difficult problem, but the "hired
guns" approach of bringing in consultants and lawyers might work
114
here as well.
iv. Presumptions and Burden-Setting in an Adversarial
Proceeding
Rather than attempting to gather together all the voices necessary
for prescribing optimal patent durations, we might instead set out
categories of inventions and a schedule for reducing their attendant
durations. We could then allow companies in various industries to
come forward to a court or administrative agency and meet a burden
of proof for showing why such industries need elevated protection in
order to produce a desirable amount of innovation while minimizing
the loss to social welfare. Such petitioners could also pursue higher
durations than the original 20 years. The benefits of such a scheme
are that it avoids the ex ante need to evaluate all categories for
optimal terms, and it puts the burden of proof on the affected industry,
which has access to the raw empirical data that could make the case
for longer patent durations. Scholarly studies attempting to collect
empirical data face the difficult task of convincing busy executives to
spend time and money compiling data without any direct benefit to
the firms for which those executives work. With the incentive of
gaining direct benefits, these firms would produce much better
information if they were required to establish a case to overcome a
burden of proof.
There could be a collective-action problem with regard to this
system as well, since the litigation expenses of one company would

113. Cf J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,94
COLUM. L. REv. 2432, 2545 (1994).
114. Cf Partnoy, supra note 89 at 33-35 (discussing a voting system in which market
participants would vote on patent length).
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pay for the potential increase in patent duration for the entire industry.
A simple way to fix this would be to reimburse the expenses of
challenging companies through an increase in patent fees for that
sector.
Of course, raising patent durations beyond the optimal level
causes social welfare loss even though the innovating firms
themselves would continue to benefit. For this reason, the petitioners
should be opposed by some kind of government-counsel adversary
who opposes cases in the same way one would in an ordinary case
before a court, including using discovery tools such as depositions
and subpoenas for documents. If the petitioners were required to
plead a specific duration, then the judge or agency hearing the petition
could either decide for or against that duration, rather than being
required to sort through the evidence to determine the proper
duration. This pleading requirement would encourage petitioners not
to overreach in their requests for longer durations. More importantly,
this system would force the industry to do the analysis on optimal
duration; thus, this scheme would match the incentive to do the
analytical work with the holders of the data needed for the analysis.
An important problem with this process is that it may leave out
inventors in politically and financially weak industrial sectors. These
may be the industries where market inefficiencies are causing the
greatest problems, and thus those industries with the greatest need for
increased incentives for innovation. The presumptive lowering of
patent durations in the absence of action would further weaken these
already weak sectors. A separate organization of government counsel
could be created to be a defender for innovators so situated.
v. Automatic or Semi-Automatic Algorithmic Systems
It might be possible to devise a system of entering information
about innovation activity, patent effectiveness, incentives, and loss to
social welfare into an algorithm or economic model, which could then
prescribe the correct patent duration on an ongoing basis. The results
could either directly vary patent protection or could be presented to a
committee that would scrutinize the results and tinker with the
suggested prescriptions based on public comment.
At first glance, such a system has all the problems discussed in
connection with attempting to substantively prescribe patent durations
based on academic study. The potentially greater promise here,
however, is incorporating the required information-gathering into the
system. For instance, many patent holders are stockholder

2006]

CALIBRATING PATENT LIFETIMES

corporations that are required to file periodic financial statements
with the Securities & Exchange Commission. Those reporting
requirements could be amended so that firms with patents had to
disclose those patents and the earnings and R&D expenditures
associated with them. This kind of information is not readily available
now. Currently, the financial statements of IP-intensive companies
often provide little or no information about the value of their
intellectual assets--despite the clear importance of this data." l 5
Indeed, firms might help themselves by endeavoring to better
understand the value of their patents and other intellectual
property.1 1 6 If companies should be doing a better job of analyzing
and collecting information about the returns from R&D for the benefit
of themselves and their investors, it would be a fair imposition to
require companies to keep such records for purposes of governmentmandated reporting.
Another potential government-mandated reporting requirement
that would provide information for economic models would be to
require patent holders to register the sale, terms, and amount-under
seal, of course-of all transfers and licenses of U.S. patents with the
Patent & Trademark Office or some other administrative agency.
Using the government to coerce the collection of this information into
a database could allow the creation of working economic models that
academic economists would never be able to build through mere
precatory requests for companies to hand over information about their
internal economic calculus of innovation.
Less ambitious than scrapping the 20-year term and starting over
again would be to use the 20-year term as a starting point, then apply
economic modeling and empirical information generated from
government-mandated
reporting
combined
with
general
macroeconomic data to find over-rewarded and under-rewarded
sectors of innovation. Such information might identify the optimal
level of innovation in a certain category of invention and show
whether the current level of innovative activity is above or below that
optimal level. Given this value, some administrative mechanism,
perhaps an automatic one not requiring the input of any administrative

115. See Gavin Clarkson & Lynda M. Applegate, IntellectualAsset Valuation, HARVARD
BUSINESS SCHOOL PUB. No. 801-192 (2000) at 1.
116. Clarkson and Applegate discuss industry's reliance on rules of thumb for determining
royalties rather than use of significant quantitative analysis to determine what the innovation is
actually worth. Using rules of thumb, Clarkson and Applegate write, licensors could wind up
"leaving money on the table," or licensees could overpay, making them worse off than if they
had not licensed the technology at all. Id. at 5.
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decision-makers, could slowly adjust the duration of patents up or
down until the desired level is reached.
Regardless of modeling and inputs, the system could be
tempered with maximum and minimum terms set by law and could be
set up in such a way that change in durations of patents would be
slow, so as not to shock any industrial sectors. Perhaps durations
could change by no more than one year on an annual basis.
The changes could come in two varieties. First, and most
intuitively fair, adjustments to patent duration would be only for yetto-be-issued patents, such that a patent issued for 22 years would stay
that way permanently, with no duration adjustments made postissuance. This ex ante perspective makes sense if patents are
primarily a tool for incentivizing innovation, rather than a means for
justly compensating innovating firms for their labors. One could
propose, however, that patent-category durations be determined ex
post. For example, a patent originally issued with a term of 20 years
could, depending on economic and financial data collected after
issuance, be terminated after only 19 years. This offers the possibility
of stemming loss of social welfare more rapidly by ending
monopolies earlier. It does, however, introduce a risk element that is
new to R&D sectors. More worrisome, an ex post manipulation of the
term would have the undesirable effect of punishing an industry for
doing well: If there is a tremendous amount of innovation, the system
would shorten patent durations in order to distribute the social welfare
surplus. Under such a rubric, the best position for a firm to be in
would be the lone successful innovator in a slumping R&D sector,
reaping a higher-than-required reward for the innovation it has
undertaken. This effect might actually be beneficial in beckoning
entrants to underperforming sectors.
CONCLUSIONS

The patent system may or may not be the best way to provide
incentives for innovation, but since patent appears to be a necessary
component of the optimal incentive scheme, it rightly deserves the
attention of scholars in providing proposals for how to increase its
beneficial effects and decrease its disadvantages.
The ad hoc manipulations suggested by this paper show
considerable promise for improving the current patent system.
Although finding the optimal duration for patents and the optimal
categories in which to place them is currently beyond the capabilities
of economists, the ad hoc reforms discussed above could create a net
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gain in societal welfare by taking into account effects of globalization
and macroeconomic variables.
In searching for absolute values, economists have failed to
provide the models and empirical data that could work together to
create substantive prescriptions for absolute values of patent
durations. Since achieving optimal or near-optimal patent duration is
an important and worthy goal, however, we should consider
delegating this task to some carefully thought-out system that can use
a reliable procedure to come up with better solutions than the current
20-year term. Among those reviewed here, the presumption / burdensetting method would be the easiest and simplest to implement. The
trade-consortia / negotiation method offers promise for a more
comprehensive solution, which could be tried alongside or as a
replacement for a presumption / burden-setting method. Finally, an
automatic / algorithmic system holds even more promise, but would
require better information than we currently have. Compelling the
gathering and disclosure of that information as a condition of patent
protection could provide the necessary data to create automatic /
algorithmic systems. A system of manipulating patents in a relativistic
way-either up or down from the current duration-offers a solidly
assured means of making the patent system better than it is, even if
such a system falls short of achieving an ideal solution.
Patents are our greatest legal effort for fueling technological
progress and creating wealth so as to attain higher standards of living.
Yet the patent regime has been the subject of little innovation itself.
The potential reward for the global economy in increased
technological innovation and human progress is very high. We
therefore ought to vigorously explore transforming the existing patent
system into a more complex and sophisticated engine of economic
growth.
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APPENDIX: BIOLOGY AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVE HORIZONS
The application of theoretical biology suggests that infinite or
very long patent lifetimes would not have any greater incentive effect
than finite patents with a duration beyond a certain horizon, which I
would estimate to be roughly in the neighborhood of 100 to 200
years. 17 The same is true for copyright. 118
To begin with, note that the vast majority of intellectual-property
creation and property ownership is reducible to actual living persons,
and people, of course, do not live forever. Although corporations are
potentially eternal in duration, their stockholders are natural persons,
all of whom will die at some point. Trusts and non-profit corporations
can be said to have infinite lifetimes that are irreducible to natural
lives, but we will assume that their stock ownership in innovating
firms is minimal. 119
Of course, future royalties can be bargained away for lump-sum
cash payments-as anyone watching commercials on late-night cable
television is likely to know. But the net present value of royalties
earned far in the future is, of course, virtually worthless in the present.
Even a billion dollars in royalties captured 200 years from now would
be worth pocket change today.
But inventors and artists may be interested in more than a
monetary gain for themselves. What about passing patents and
copyrights along as inheritance? Certainly some creators will be
motivated to accumulate wealth for their children or, perhaps, for
their grandchildren. But looking beyond 200 years, we are in the
realm of great-great-great-great-great-grandchildren.1 20 Is anyone
117. See Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 92 (suggesting infinite duration). See also Partnoy,
supra note 89, at 20, 25 (suggesting that with high interest rates, an infinite patent duration may
be optimal).
118. For an argument that copyright should be capable of being extended indefinitely for
reasons other than providing incentives to create, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003).
119. If it turns out, for example, that charitable entities are a significant source of funding
for research and development leading to patents the charitable entity will own, then it is at least
plausible that a board of trustees might make be induced to make a decision about funding
research based on the promise of endless returns from an infinite patent.
120. Assuming an average childbearing age of 30, a person will have a great-great-greatgreat-great-grandchild at 210 years after his or her own birth, each such descendant being
1/128th related to that person. If the average childbearing age is younger, the descendant will be
even more distantly related. If the age is 20, at 200 years there would be great-times-eightgrandchildren, each 1/1024th related to the ancestor. Even if the average childbearing age were
much older, for example 50, then at 200 years one's great-great-children would be born, related
by 1/16.
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likely to be motivated by the potential future existence of these
unknown distant relations?
Each parent is exactly 1/2 related to each of his or her children.
That is, the child carries half of the genes of each parent. It follows
that a grandparent is 1/4 related to each grandchild. Carrying out the
math, a person is only 1/128 related to his or her great-great-greatgreat-great-grandchild.
While biology indicates that people should care about the wealth
of those closely related to them in future generations, there are
horizons in time beyond which people simply will not be incentivized
by accumulation of wealth in progeny. These "horizons" are not hardand-fast thresholds, but are, instead, indefinite boundaries that are
determined by natural selection.
Samuel Clemens, better known under the pen-name Mark Twain,
argued before British Parliament and the U.S. Congress for perpetual
copyright. But even in doing so, he was compelled to admit that his
interests in the duration of his works ended well short of eternity. In
testimony before Congress in 1906, Clemens said about the thenproposed term of the life of the author plus 50 years:
I think that would satisfy any reasonable author, because it would
take care of his children. Let the grand-children take care of
themselves. That would take care of my daughters, and after that I
am not particular. I shall then have long been out of this struggle,
12 1
independent of it, indifferent to it.

There is not enough space here to provide a thorough
explanation of the relevant biological theory as it regards natural
selection and altruistic behavior. 122 I will provide only a quick sketch
here.
There are two foundational observations to make. First, note that
natural selection works on the level of the gene, not the species,
group, or individual. This means that genes will spread through an
evolving population if they cause the exhibition of a trait that tends to
cause the passing on of copies of those genes. Second, note that each
individual has a pair of complimentary genes, one from the mother

121. Arguments Before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and House of
Representatives, Conjointly, on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, 59th Cong. 116-21 (1906), reprintedin
Samuel L. Clemens, Copyright in Perpetuity, 6 GREEN BAG 109, 110 (2002).
122. For a comprehensive, carefully made case for the biological theory (sometimes called
"sociobiology") used for the analysis herein, see RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE

(Oxford U. Press 1989).
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and one from the father. The chance for passing on any given gene to
an offspring is 1/2.
So, for example, assume there is a gene for wanting to feed one's
children. 123
This "childcare gene" would be evolutionarily
successful, because it would add to the health and, eventually, the
reproductive capacity, of individuals who were carrying that gene.
Such a gene would, of course, also add to the reproductive capacity of
offspring who were not carrying that gene.
Although genes do not have conscious goals, it can be helpful to
phrase the explanation as if they did: The childcare gene only has a
50-percent chance of hitting its target. Call this the gene's "wasted
effort." This makes the gene less evolutionarily fit than if it could
somehow direct the parent to only care for children that had the gene.
Because of the structural and functional biology of humans, however,
genes tend not to function this way. Nonetheless, the childcare gene
would be more successful than alternative genes that coded for an
absence of childcare, because the offspring of couples without the
gene would be disadvantaged compared to the offspring having a 50percent chance of holding the gene. Then, inheritors of the childcare
gene will care for their own offspring, enhancing the gene's prospects
for survival and reproduction.
As noted, a grandparent is exactly 1/4 related to his or her
grandchildren. Genes for grandchild-care would also be successful,
but such genes would have a "wasted effort" of 75 percent, since only
25 percent of grandchildren, on average, would be carrying the
grandchild-care gene.
With great-grandchildren, 1/8 related to each of their greatgrandparents, altruistic behavior should be even less. As the genetic
relations grow smaller, there will be less and less accompanying
altruism. At some point, the relation becomes so attenuated, perhaps
at 1/8 or smaller, a gene for altruism toward descendants would cease
to provide significant evolutionary advantage. Even without
disadvantageous effects, a gene conferring only a slight advantage
may be lost in evolutionary noise-the random effects of the
environment and the interactions of other genes. In addition, a gene
that provided for altruistic behavior toward distant descendants might
be evolutionarily unfit if it caused care to be taken away from closer
relatives.

123.

The "gene" discussed here is an imaginary one for the purposes of a simple model.
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The foregoing suggests that intellectual property creators will not
care about the financial rewards created by patents and copyrights
beyond a certain point in time, perhaps the likely death of their
grandchildren. This is because human altruism should not, on the
basis of theoretical biology, be expected to extend substantially into
the generations beyond. Humans should have a strong desire to help
themselves and their children, but not, as explained, their great-greatgreat-grandchildren.
The exact dividing line is perhaps unknowable, although more
careful analysis with reference to scientific data could provide a more
specific range. But the principle alone is significant: The human
animal cannot be expected to undertake some endeavor or forego
something in the present for the promise of helping distant relations.
Likewise, the law should not create intellectual property incentives
with the vague idea that it perhaps could.
Venturing away from patents and copyrights for the moment, if
it were true that people wanted to help their distant descendants, we
might expect to see a demand for financial products that could make
this happen. People could purchase special savings bonds that
matured hundreds of years from now. That way, anyone could use
their lunch money to make a great-great-great-great-great-grandchild
extremely rich. It seems people would rather eat lunch than give some
distant descendant a life of luxury and leisure. By contrast, it is
unremarkable that people might work their whole lives to have a
modest house on a small plot of land to leave for their children. I
think it is fair to say that the intuitive result matches the theoretical
conclusion.
Yet there is another, even larger problem with undertaking some
endeavor to benefit, for instance, great-great-great-great-greatgrandchildren. In a stable population, the average couple will raise an
average of two children--each child replacing one parent-for a
population that neither grows nor shrinks. If everyone has two
children each, then everyone will have four grandchildren, eight
great-grandchildren, and-carrying out the math-128 great-greatgreat-times-fivethe
all
If
great-great-great-grandchildren.
grandchildren get an equal share of royalties every year, each such
share may not be much at all. Publishing royalties on even a
moderately successful book would be thinly divided at such a
generation.
At some point, the rights become divided up among so many
people that they are nearly worthless to any one person. Recent
scientific analysis has indicated that all humans alive today may share
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a single common ancestor who lived perhaps as recently as 3,500
years ago. 124 If an Adam or Eve had invented the wheel 3,500 years
ago, would we really want our share of the royalties? We would pay
just as much as we receive. Even more absurd is the case where a
long-dead inventor is the ancestor of many, but not all living humans.
Suppose that the inventor of crucial improvements in plow design,
who lived about 1,000 years ago, was an ancestor of a third of today's
world population. Should the other two-thirds of the world pay a
surcharge on food to the one-third of the world luckily related to the
inventor? More to the point, would any inventor be spurred on to
work harder and invent more because of the promise of being the
distant progenitor to some lucky fraction of the world's population?
The answer is clearly no.
This crude sketch of natural-selection theory shows that it is
specious to argue that infinite or very long patent lifetimes or
copyright terms will offer any more incentive than relatively short,
finite durations.

124. Douglas L. T. Rohde, Steve Olson & Joseph T. Chang, Modelling the recent common
ancestry of all living humans 431 NATURE 431, 562-66 (2004).

